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Jacobson: The Child Online Protection Act: Taming the World "Wild" Web

THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT:
TAMING THE WORLD "WILD" WEB
INTRODUCTION

Imagine arriving home one evening after a hard day's work.
Your child is sitting at the brand new computer that you just
purchased for the family. You thought it would be a great idea to
have a computer in the home so you could convince your child to
do his or her detested homework. However, on this particular
night, you observe your child working diligently on a report about
the executive branch of government. Looking over his shoulder,
your eyes widen in horror. On the 13-inch monitor, you see a
crystal clear picture of a completely naked woman engaged in a
number of sexual acts.
The reason these shocking images appear on the screen instead
of information about the White House is because your son has
typed the World Wide Web address www.whitehouse.com rather
than www.whitehouse.gov. This results in a connection to a
pornographic Web site with free samples that anyone, regardless of
age, can access.'
Congress previously attempted to protect minors from material
such as this by enacting the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA") which, among other things, banned obscene or indecent
communications over the Internet to persons under the age of 18,
and banned patently offensive communications over the Internet to
persons under the age of 18.2 Despite Congress' good intentions,
the CDA was struck down as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad by the Supreme Court3 . The 10 5 'h session of Congress
has again attempted to shield children from what they see as
indecent and harmful material by passing the Child Online
Protection Act ("COPA") in October of 1998.

1. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 11 (the report states that minors searching for
the official White House Web site could innocently come across a site filled
with hardcore pornography quite easily).
2.47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d).
3. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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Section II of this article will address the history of speech
regulation of other types of media by the Supreme Court. Section
III will summarize the characteristics of the Internet itself and the
prevalence of it in the public's minds. Section IV analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union4 , the decision that led to the enactment of COPA. Sections
V and VI discuss COPA itself and why Congress feels that it will
pass muster under constitutional scrutiny. Section VII addresses
recent developments with COPA, and analyzes whether or not the
new law will survive under immense pressure to strike it down.
I. BACKGROUND OF SPEECH REGULATION OF THE MEDIA

Reno v. ACLU was the latest in a long line of Supreme Court
cases discussing the rights of minors, as compared to adults, to
access obscene or indecent materials. The new twist in Reno was
the medium involved: an entirely new means of communication
know as the Internet. But as history demonstrates, the Court has
gone to great lengths to define a standard for obscenity and
indecency for the more traditional forms of mass communication.
A. Ginsbergv. New York'
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of children and "harmful
materials" for the first time in 1972 in Ginsberg v. New York, a
case where the statute prohibited the sale of obscene materials to
minors under 17, focusing primarily on whether the materials
could be considered obscene to children.6 The appellant in this
case did not argue that the state had no power to restrict the sale of
certain materials to minors. Rather, he contended that if material
was not considered to be obscene to adults, then it should not be
considered as obscene to a minor.7
4. Id.
5. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
6. Ginsberg 390 U.S. at 631.
7. Id. at 636.
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The Court rejected this argument.' It stated that minors had no
constitutionally protected freedoms to read sexually explicit
materials. "The power of the state to control the conduct of the
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."9
The Court stated that there were two justifications for this type of
regulation, assuming the legislature found that such material might
be harmful to minors.1
First, the Constitution recognizes that
parents want to protect their children from this type of material,
and should have the full support of the law. Second, the Court
recognized that the state has a separate interest in the well being of
its youth.' These interests necessitated laws like the New York
statute to protect minors from harmful materials, as long as they
did not hinder the efforts of adults to gain access to the same
materials not deemed as obscene. 2
B. FederalCommunications Commission v. Pacifica3
Four years after Ginsberg, the Supreme Court confronted
broadcast indecency for the first time in the Pacifica case, which
presented to the Court the dilemma over whether the FCC had the
authority to regulate the content of indecent material over the
airwaves. The commission argued that though it could not
necessarily ban non-obscene but indecent language, it did have the
power to "channel" the material by enforcing time, place and
manner restrictions. 4
The Court agreed with the FCC.'
It stated two major
justifications for the regulation. First, it recognized the "uniquely
8. Id. at 629.
9. Id. at 638, citing Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,

170 (1944).
10. Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 639.

11. Id. at 639-40.
12. Id. at 635.

13. 438 U.S 726 (1978).
14. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32, citing In the Matter of a Citizen's
Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98

(1975).
15. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 726.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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pervasive presence" of broadcast radio.16 The Court thought the
fact that listeners continuously tune into and away from radio
stations rendered any warning system ineffective. Once someone
tuned in and heard something offensive, the harm had already
occurred. Also, the Court recognized that indecent material
"presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights
of an intruder."17
The second justification for regulation was that broadcasting's
unique accessibility to children. The Court turned to Ginsberg for
support, stating that the "government's interest in the 'well being
of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their
own household' justified the regulation of otherwise protected
speech." 8 Coupled with the easy accessibility to radio, the
regulation was considered acceptable by the Court.

C. Sable Communications v. FederalCommunications
Commission9
After approving limited regulation of broadcast material, the
Court addressed the issue of government regulation of telephone
usage and indecency. Referred to as the "dial-a-porn" case20 , the
Supreme Court made it clear that although the government could
regulate non-obscene, indecent speech broadcast over the airwaves,
it was somewhat restricted in doing so with other types of media
that were not as widely-disseminated or as easily accessible.
At issue in this case was Section 223(b) of the Communication
Act of 1934, as amended in 1988.21 The statute imposed a ban on

16. Id. at 748.
17.Id.
18. Id. at 749, citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, 640.
19. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
20. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 118.

21. 47 U.S.C § 223(b).
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any interstate commercial phone messages that were either obscene
or indecent.22
The Court agreed with the Congress on the matter of
transmitting obscene messages through commercial pornographic
phone outlets, stating that the First Amendment has never offered
protection to any type of obscene material. 23 However, it ruled
differently on the ban on indecency, holding that the statute was
not narrowly drawn enough to achieve its legitimate purpose of
protecting minors from indecent pornographic telephone
messages.24
The government tried to rely on Pacifica21 to bolster its
argument that this behavior should be criminalized, but the Court
was not convinced.26 The Court distinguished Pacifica from the
dial-a-porn situation, stating that the FCC did not place a total ban
on indecency, but rather placed a time/place/manner restriction on
broadcast. 7 The Court also recognized that in Pacifica, the unique
attributes of broadcasting had been a decisive factor in the ruling.28
It could not find that telephones shared the similar enough
characteristics to warrant a ban like the one at issue. While
material broadcast over radio is fairly difficult to avoid when
channel surfing, dial-a-porn required "affirmative steps to receive
'
the communication."29
The Court noted that in Pacifica, it had
been "careful 'to emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding."' 30
While a regulation merely limiting indecent material had been
upheld in the past by the Court, legislation that infringed upon
adults' rights to obtain this type of material by banning it
altogether would not be tolerated. Though the Court saw
protecting minors from indecency as a legitimate government
interest, banning this type of communication prevented adults from
22. Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 117.
23. Id. at 124.
24. Id. at 126.
25. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 726.
26. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. ai 127.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 127-28.
30. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128, citing Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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gaining access to material that they had a constitutional right to
hear.
In short, these three cases display the Government's power to
regulate obscenity and indecency communicated by certain media.
Access to minors can be restricted as long as adults' constitutional
rights are not infringed upon. These rules may sound fairly simple
to enforce, but the dawn of the Internet, particularly the World
Wide Web, has rendered attempts at Government regulation of this
type much more difficult.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET

The Internet is unlike any other sort of communication medium
the world had ever experienced, defined as "a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication."31 It presents
opportunities to disseminate information like no other. There are
no regional limitations on the Internet as there are on radio and
television broadcasts. Someone in China could be reading the
same message that someone is creating in Janesville, Wisconsin. It
is a complex network that allows for one-on-one communications,
as well as for hundreds of people to have a discussion on a range of
topics. It presents a number of problems for a Government that
wants to regulate it by following the same rules for regulating
broadcast and print media because the Internet is just so
completely different than those media; yet its impact is being felt
worldwide.

A. BackgroundInformation
It seems that in this day and age, a computer is almost a
necessity to keep in touch with what is going on in the world. A
primary reason for that is the ever-expanding usage of what is
known as the Internet.
31. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2334.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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The Internet is defined as a "catch-all word used to describe the
massive world-wide network of computers. The word 'internet'
literally means 'network of networks."' 32 The Internet is "an
international network of interconnected computers" that began as
an outgrowth of a military program called "ARPANET" in 1969." 3
The system was designed to enable military computers to
communicate with each other, even if some portions of the network
were damaged during war, by communicating over redundant
channels.34 This network, while no longer in operation, provided
an example of the mass amounts of information that could be
communicated over a network linking millions of people
together.35
The World Wide Web is mainly utilized over the Internet, but,
unlike what most people think, they are not one and the same.
While the Internet refers to the "physical side of the global
network," meaning the mass of cable and computers utilized across
the world, the World Wide Web (referred to as the "Web") refers
to "a body of information-an abstract space of knowledge."36 The
official description of the Web is a "wide-area hypermedia
information retrieval initiative aiming to give universal access to a
large universe of documents," as well as pictures, naughty or
nice.37
The Web was created in March 1989 as a means of transporting
ideas and information throughout the European Council for
Nuclear Research ("CERN")38 , a collective of European physics
researchers. It was seen as an efficient means of communication
since the members of CERN were located throughout the
32. Entering the World Wide Web: A Guide to Cyberspace, (visited Jan. 13,
1999), <http://www.hcc.hawaii.edu>.
33. Reno, 177 S.Ct. at 2334 (explaining that "ARPANET" is an acronym
describing the network developed by the Advanced Research Project Agency).
34. Id.
35.Id.
36. Entering the World Wide Web: A Guide to Cyberspace, supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. The acronym CERN refers to the earlier French title of the organization,
"Conseil Europeen pour le Recherche Nucleaire," (or in English, European
Council for Nuclear Research). See CERN Web Site at <http://www.cern.ch>.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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continent.39 Since its inception in 1989, the Web has expanded
beyond what anyone had imagined.
The sheer number of Web pages is simply mind-boggling. As of
July 1998, there were 300 million sites, and every day, there were
1.5 million new sites being created.40 If the numbers alone do not
convince of the impact the Internet has had on the world, one only
has to look at the number of users. Each month, the increase in
total Internet traffic approaches 30 percent.41

B. Growth of the Internet andEase of Use
It seems more and more that the Internet is everywhere: schools,
libraries, and, more prevalently than ever, homes. Since January of
1996, one month before the CDA was enacted, the number of
computers physically connected to the Internet has more than
tripled, from approximately 9.4 million hosts to more than 29.6
million hosts.42 More importantly, the number of minors using the
Internet has increased. Robert Pitosfsky, Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission, testified before Congress as to the number of
minors who access the Internet. According to Chairman Pitosfsky,
the number of minors on the Web has doubled since the previous
year, to about 16 million users as of September of 1998. 4' The
Supreme Court noted in Reno v. ACLU that by this year, the
number of people using the Internet would "mushroom" to 200
million.'
Congress noted that the pornographic material infiltrates this
same communications network that an immense number of minors
utilize.45 It reported that pornography on the Internet is a
39.Id.
40. History of the Internet and WWW-Part 8: Statistics, (visited Jan. 13,
1999), <http://www.wenet.net/netvalley>.
41. Id.
42. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 10 (1998).
43. Id.
44. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2334.
45. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 8.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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flourishing business, with about 28,000 different Web sites
generating almost $925 million in revenues per year.46 Though the
Supreme Court has declared that the Internet cannot be regulated
under the same standard as broadcast communications because of
the lack of invasiveness of the Internet, Congress disagrees. It
stated in the Commerce Committee report on COPA, discussed
below, that "while clearly the Internet is not yet as 'invasive' as
broadcasting, its popularity and growth because of electronic
commerce and expansive Federal subsidy programs47 make it
'
widely accessible to minors."48
The Commerce Committee
recognized that any minor who can read and type on a keyboard
can easily access materials on the Internet because of the
software's simplicity."
The committee also found that a history of extensive regulation
of the adult entertainment industry provides the Government with
the authority to further regulate the industry on the Internet, though
the communications network itself had been subject to little or no
legislation at all."0
IX. SUPREME COURT STRIKES DowN INTERNET PROVISIONS:
51
RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

On the very same day that President Clinton signed the CDA
into law, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. That court struck down the provisions at issue, and

46. Id.
47. This "subsidy" refers to a national effort to connect all schools and
libraries to the Internet. See In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, Report and Order, CC Docket 96-45, FCC 97-157 (May 8,
1997).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 8.
51. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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the battle of Reno v. ACLU had begun. 2 The next step was
arguing its constitutionality to the United States Supreme Court.
Reno was the first time the Court was confronted with the
complex issue of Internet speech regulation. As explained above,
the complexities of this network made it much more difficult for
the Government to tailor criteria so that the constitutional freedoms
of adults would not be curbed when trying to prevent minors from
accessing inappropriate material.
The Supreme Court dealt a major blow to Internet regulation
when it handed down its decision in Reno. This ruling mandated a
strict scrutiny analysis to any speech regulation of the Internet."3
The Court dealt with two provisions of the CDA 4 . Section
223(a) prohibited any person from making any communication
over the Internet "which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient is under 18 years of age." Section 223(d) prohibited any
person from knowingly sending over the Internet any
communication that would be available to a person under the age
of 18 and that depicted or described "in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs.""5 Both provisions were struck
down as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 6
The Court began its discussion by comparing other forms of
mass media that had been regulated by the Government. The
petitioners relied on Ginsberg and Pacifica to support their
argument that the CDA was constitutional, but the Court
distinguished the forms of mass communication that were
regulated in those situations. 7

52. Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued
Struggle in Western ConstitutionalDemocracies with Internet Censorship and
Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L. REv. 765, 778-780 (1998).
53. Sheri A. Dillon, Douglas E. Groene, & Todd Hayward, Computer Crimes,
35 AM. GRIM. L. REV.503, 518 (1998).
54. Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56.
55.47 U.S.C.A. §223(a), §223(d).
56. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
57. Id. at 2341.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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The statute in Ginsberg prohibited the selling of material to
people under 17 that would be considered obscene to them even if
not considered obscene as to adults. The Court saw this statute as
narrowly drawn to meet the governmental interest because it did
not infringe upon adults' rights, it was aimed at strictly commercial
transactions, and it defined the regulated material very
specifically."8 The CDA provisions infringed upon all Internet
users, regardless of age.
It also regulated all types of
communications on the Internet, commercial and private. The
CDA also failed to specifically define its restrictions. 9 In fact, it
completely failed to define "indecent," and did not require that the
"patently offensive" material being regulated lack any serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value pursuant to the
Miller" obscenity standard.61
The Court also found significant differences between Pacifica
and the present case. Radio, a medium that had been regulated for
decades by the government, "had 'received the most limited First
Amendment protection' in large part because warnings could not
adequately protect the listener from unexpected program
content."62 Also of importance was that the FCC regulation was
not punitive in manner, nor was it a total ban on indecency, but
rather a time, place and manner restriction. The Internet had no
such history of governmental monitoring or regulation.63 The CDA
placed a total ban on the communications enumerated in the Act,
as well as criminal sanctions against those who violated the law.'

58. Id., citing Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 646-647.
59. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2341.
60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (the Court provided the basic
guidelines for the trier of fact to determine obscenity: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value).
61. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2341.
62. Id. at 2342, citing Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
63. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2342.
64. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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The Court also pointed out that the regulations imposed upon
pomographers and radio were aimed at commercial behavior and
entities. No such claim could be made about the CDA. It punished
the behavior of Internet pornographers and the actions of
consenting adults having a private communication.
The Court emphasized the nature of the Internet when comparing
it to the broadcast media being regulated in Ginsberg and
Pacifica.6" It did not possess the same invasive nature of the
broadcast medium. The Court pointed out this fact by quoting the
District Court: "communications over the Internet do not 'invade'
an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen
66
unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident."'
Turning to the issue of vagueness, the Court found that the
differing definitions of what was restricted by the two provisions
being contested were unconstitutionally vague. 67 Because of the
lack of definition for "indecent" or "patently offensive," Internet
users would be unsure of what they were and were not allowed to
communicate on-line, causing an overall chilling effect on speech.
Furthermore, the fact that the two sections utilized different
descriptions of what was outlawed would lend to a great amount of
confusion. 68 The inability to identify exactly what was
inappropriate constituted a major problem when applying the
CDA.69
The CDA was also unconstitutionally overbroad, according to
the Court.7"
It stated that the "burden on adult speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
65. Id. at 2343.
66. Id. at 2343, citing American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
67. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2344.
68. Id. at 2344 (explaining the different linguistic form used in the two
different sections: Sec. 223(a) used the word indecent; Sec. 223(d) described the
restricted material as that which "in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs").
69. Id. at 2346.
70. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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enacted to serve."7 1 The regulation would punish speech that may
be illegal for minors to receive, but is protected if the
communication is between two adults. Along the same lines, the
Court pointed out that with the advent of the "chat room,"' it
would be next to impossible for an adult to know a minor has
entered the chat room.73 Fear of this could have a chilling effect on
discussion of important issues by adults. Therefore, the CDA
could not pass constitutional muster.
IV. CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT

Though the Supreme Court did impose a strict scrutiny standard
on any proposed content regulation of the Internet, it did leave
plenty of room for Congress to create a law that would be more
narrowly tailored and still protect the interest of minors. This is
precisely what Congress has done with the introduction of COPA.74
Congressman Billy Tauzin of Louisiana stated during debate over
the proposed bill the basic objective: to "simply make it illegal to
sell pornography to minors on the World Wide Web unless and
'
until an adult verification system is in place."75
He added that the
bill addressed all the points made by the Supreme Court in Reno.
He added that the bill "has a narrow prohibition, tighter definition,
and a realization that the applicability of the law may change as
'
technology is involved."76
COPA was introduced in the House of Representatives on April
30, 1998 by Congressman Michael Oxley as House Resolution
71. Id.
72. A "chat room" is an online interactive discussion group on the Internet.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, (visited May 5, 1999) <http://www.m-

w.com>.
73. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2347 (explaining that "given the potential audience for
most, messages, in the absence of a viable age verification process, the sender
must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view
it.. .knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat
group will be minor.. .would surely burden communication among adults").
74. H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998).

75. 144 Cong. Rec. H9906-01.
76. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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3783. 77 H.R. 3783 was sent to the House Commerce Committee
on that date, and was reported out on September 24, 1998.78 The
bill was passed in the House a few weeks later on October 7, and
subsequently was signed into law by President Clinton.
A. Availability ofHarmful Material
The Commerce Committee issued a report to the House floor in
September recommending passage of COPA. It stated that in
1996, about half of the material online was "unsuitable" for
children. 79 In 1998, that number had risen to almost 70 percent.80
The report also stated that many times Internet users would
stumble upon these "unsuitable" sites accidentally, especially when
the sites use misleading names to take advantage of a user's
innocent mistake or ignorance.8
Once the committee established the fact that minors could access
pornographic material very easily on the Internet, it turned to
showing how sexually explicit material is harmful to minors. The
report stated that a minor's sexual development occurs gradually
throughout childhood, and that exposure to pornography gives
them the wrong impression about sexuality.8" The committee said
that pornography "teaches without supervision or guidance,
inundating children's minds with graphic messages about their
bodies, their own sexuality, and those of adults and children
around them."83 Testimony before the committee from Dr. Mary
Anne Layden backed up the assumption that pornography is
77. 105 Bill Tracking Report H.R. 3783.

78. Id.
79. 144 Cong. Rec. H9902-01, H9906, citing Half of 'Net Content Said
Unsuitablefor Children,REUTERS FINANCIAL SERVICE (Jan. 10, 1996).
80. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 11, citing The Net's Dirty Little Secret: Sex
Sells, UPSIDE PUBLISHING COMPANY (April 1998).
81. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 11 (the report states that minors searching for
the official White House Web site, when typing "www.whitehouse.comn" instead
of "www.whitehouse.gov" will encounter a Web site filled with hard-core

pornography).
82. Id.
83. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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harmful to minors. She stated that it produces "permission-giving
beliefs" for sexual pathology and violence.84
B. New Regulatory Statute Introduced
The fact that the Internet is the "medium of choice for electronic
commerce," and has "the ability to reach more Americans on more
topics, including pornography, than we have seen from traditional
mediums of communications in the past," gave Congress
motivation to enact COPA to protect minors from accessing
obscene or indecent material on the World Wide Web.85
The bill was referred to the House of Representatives'
Committee on Commerce in order to amend Section 223 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (the same section that had been
amended by the CDA). The committee reported favorably on the
bill, and recommended passage by the House.86
Section 231(a)(1) of the act prohibits the following conduct:
"Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World
Wide Web, makes any communication for the commercial
purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any
material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than
87
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.,
The prohibited conduct can be broken down into three basic
parts: (1) The communication must be a knowing transmission to a
minor (under the age of 17); (2) The transmission must be made
for commercial purposes; and (3) The material must be proven
harmful.
The result of any violation under COPA would be $50,000 per
each violation 8 . Each day communications of the prohibited type
continue would be considered a new violation, hence a new fine.8
84. Id. at 12.

85. Id. at 9.
86. 105 Bill Tracking Report H.R. 3783.

87.47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
88. Id.
89.47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2).
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In addition to criminal liability, the violator may be subjected to
civil fines of up to $50,000 per violation as well.
Congress did provide three possible affirmative defenses that
could be raised by someone, in good faith, accused of making a
prohibited communication. One defense is if the defendant
requires use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number in order to access the material
on that particular Web site, he may be absolved from guilt.91
Secondly, if the defendant uses a system of accepting digital
certificates that verify age, he may be innocent of wrongdoing. 2
Third, if the defendant uses any other reasonable measures that are
feasible under existing technology, he can escape liability.93
The statute defines what would be considered harmful to give
commercial entities that market Web sites some guidance. The act
states that harmful means:
Any communication, picture image, graphic image
file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of
any kind that is obscene or that the average person,
applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; depicts,
describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or
simulated sexual act or sexual conduct, an actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubertal female
breast; and taken as a whole lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 94

90. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3).

91. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B).
93.47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(C).
94. H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. Sec. (3)(e)(6)(A), (B), (C).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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By enacting COPA, Congress felt that it had satisfied all the
criticisms that the Supreme Court had leveled at the CDA by
drafting legislation that would not be overbroad or vague, and yet
still be effective in preventing children from accessing
inappropriate material.
V. CONGRESS ARGUES THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COPA

A. CongressHas a Compelling Interest in ProtectingChildren.
The Supreme Court stated in New York v. Ferber that "it is
evident beyond the need for elaboration that the State's interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor
is compelling."95 The Court has stated that this interest "extends to
shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene
by adult standards.96
Congress recognizes that the primary responsibility in caring for
a child's welfare is held by the parent, all parents deserve all the
help from the Government that they can get." This is especially
relevant when children have plenty of opportunities to access the
Internet outside of the home.98
B. H.R. 3783 is Narrowly Tailoredto Meet the Compelling
Interest.
Congress tailored this bill to limit its effects to commercial
speech, absolutely avoiding the attempt of regulating private, noncommercial communications.

95.458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
96. Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 126.
97. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 12.
98. Id.
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COPA also avoids limiting one-on-one e-mail transmissions,
real-time communications (i.e. chat rooms), telnet services, or
gopher services, like "Yahoo" or "Excite!".99
The bill also provides a great amount of flexibility for Internet
companies in the business of selling pornography. The three
affirmative good faith defenses a company can raise provides
ample protection from prosecution if the companies can show that
they adopted reasonable measures to restrict a minor's access to
material that is harmful.1'
C. CongressDeclaresH.R. 3783 is Consistentwith Reno v.
ACLU
The House Commerce Committee stated in its report that this
bill is specifically designed to address the concerns of the Supreme
Court in Reno because this piece of legislation is not an
unnecessarily broad law that will suppress more speech than it is
meant to suppress."'
1. "Harmful to minors" is clearly defined within the statute.
The Court was extremely concerned over the vagueness of the
terms "indecency" and "patently offensive" definitions in the
CDA.' 2 COPA modified the "patently offensive" language from
the CDA and explicitly described material that is harmful to
minors in this bill. It states that "material that displays an actual or
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal
or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
female breast."' 3 The new definition of what is harmful to minors
99. Services such as "Yahoo!" or "Excite" are known as search engines,
which are services that can be utilized to search the World Wide Web for many
types of information. See <http://www.yahoo.com>or <http://www.excite.com>
for more information.
100. H. R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 13.
101. Id.
102.47 U.S.C.A Sec. 223(a), (d).
103. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 13.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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also states that the material is only harmful if "taken as a whole,
[it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors. ,, °
The House Commerce Committee also cites to the fact that state
display laws containing a "harmful to minors" definitions have
repeatedly been upheld when challenged in federal appellate
courts. 5
2. The scope is limited to commercial transactions
The Court in Reno expressed its unhappiness with the fact that
the CDA regulations were not limited to commercial speech, but
also covered "all non-profit entities and individuals posting
indecent messages or displaying them in the presence of
minors.' 06
In response to this concern, COPA was careful to limit this bill
to criminalizing commercial behavior only. The committee report
on the bill states that it "does not prohibit non-commercial
activities over the Web, or over the Internet for that matter, and
thus the concerns raised by the Supreme Court are no longer
applicable."'0 7
Since, as the committee noted, a large amount of harmful
material will be available to minors through non-commercial
outlets, § 230(f)(2) of COPA anticipates the submission of
proposals from the computer industry on how to limit minors'
access to inappropriate materials.'

104. Id.
105. Id. at 13-14 citing Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1249 (1997); American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d

1493 (1lth Cir. 1990); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Com. Of Virginia, 882
F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989); Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis,
780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th
Cir. 1983).
106. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.

107. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 14.
108. Id.
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3. Age verificationsystems are technologically and
economicallyfeasible.
The committee notes in its report that the Supreme Court stated
in its Reno opinion that, "with regard to restricting access by
minors by requiring use of a verified credit card or adult
verification, that 'such verification is not only technologically
available but is used by commercial providers of sexually explicit
material."' °9 The Court had also been concerned that noncommercial outlets would not be able to afford this type of
technology, essentially creating a chilling effect on these operators'
speech.Y0
The committee also recognized the fact that the Court has
already upheld similar commercial restrictions in Sable,"' where
either payment by credit card or authorization by access or
identification code was required to hear dial-a-porn messages."'
The committee report states that the Court in Sable "found such
commercial restrictions would be effective in excluding most
juveniles" except for the most "enterprising and disobedient"
minors."13
It is also pointed out that many commercial distributors on the
Web already utilize the means proposed by this bill to limit
minors' access to this material. Besides being economically wise
for the providers to comply with the provisions of the bill (with the
penalty being a $50,000 fine per violation), it could be profitable as
payment of a fee through use
well, seeing that many sites require
4
site.1
a
enter
to
of a credit card

109. Id., citing Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2349.
110. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2347.
111. Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 115.
112. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 14-15.
113. Id. at 15 citing Sable Communications, 429 U.S. at 130.
114. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 15.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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4. Parentsmaintain controland minor is defined aspeople
underseventeen.
The committee report points out that, unlike the CDA, this bill
does not infringe upon the fights of a parent to raise a child in a
manner he or she sees fit. The CDA criminalized parental behavior
if pornographic material was obtained for a minor by his or her
parent, as well as indecent communications that a an adult and
child took place in on the Internet, whether or not that adult was
the child's parent. This issue is resolved by restricting the bill's
reach to commercial pornography providers." 5
5. Congress has thepower to regulate the Internet.
The committee report states that Congress definitely has the
power to regulate the Internet, as is evident through the laws that it
has enacted during the 105dh session: intellectual property rights
over the Internet, whether the Internet should be taxed, and how
communications over the Internet can be kept secure." 6 The report
goes on to state that Congress' authority to regulate the Internet is
derived directly from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution. 7 The committee says, "Regardless of
whether Congress exercises its authority under this section, the
power of Congress to regulate in this area remains constant."'18
6. Legislative hearings highlight the problem.
It was reported that both the House and the Senate had held
extensive hearings in order to find ways of reducing a minor's

115. Id.
116.Id.
at 16.
117. Id.
118. Id. (said in response to claims made by the Court in Reno that the
Internet cannot be so regulated by Congress because of the lack of history of
regulation).
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access to harmful materials such as these.' 19 This was in response
to criticism of the Court in Reno that no legislative hearings were
held to determine if the CDA provisions were the appropriate
measures to take at the time. 120
Though Congress felt COPA would survive a court's analysis,
another battle had begun. History repeated itself last fall when the
ACLU once again challenged the constitutionality of the new law
in federal courts. A restraining ordered was issued until a full trial
could be held to determine the law's merits.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COPA QUESTIONED

A. COPA Struck Down In FederalCourt
It was dejA vu for the Government. Three years earlier, in the
very same courtroom, the CDA had been struck down by a federal
judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 121 On February 1, 1999, that same judge blocked
the implementation of COPA, stating that the impact of the new
law would be to chill speech online."' Judge Lowell Reed Jr., of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, handed down his ruling after first issuing a
temporary restraining order last fall against enforcement of the law.
The ACLU brought suit, joined by an eclectic group of media
and Internet enterprises, ranging from The New York Times and
MSNBC to Condomania, an online condom retailer. 123
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, Judge Reed, stating his
views on threatened speech, sets the tone for the opinion: "If
speech, even unconventional speech that some find lacking in
119. H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 at 16.
120. Id.
121. Pamela Mandels, Internet Smut Law Enters Court, With a Snag, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999.
122. Pamela Mandels, Setback for a Law Shielding Minors from Adult Web
Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999.
123. Mandels, supra note 121.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/7
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substance or offensive, is allowed to compete unrestricted in the
'
marketplace of ideas, truth will be discovered."124
B. The Arguments For and Against COPA
The petitioners attacked COPA on several grounds. They began
by stating that the new law is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to them because regulation of speech that is "harmful to
minors" places a burden on a large amount of speech that is
considered protected as to adults.12 They also allege that the fact
the statute only provides affirmative defenses to this direct ban on
protected speech adds to the burden. 26 By implementing the
procedures suggested by the act as affirmative defenses, the
government is imposing both an "economic and technological
burden" upon Internet operators who are unsure if the material they
transmit is even covered by the act. 27 By imposing these
technological procedures, such as registering with the site to prove
age, the speaker loses users by forcing them to disclose their
identity. Both sides subsequently suffer.128
The Government argued that COPA survives strict scrutiny
because it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest, that interest being protecting minors from "harmful
materials." '2 9 The overbreadth argument is addressed by the
Government, which that the "harmful to minors" definition only
applies to commercial pornographers who distribute such material
"as a regular course" of their business." The Government claims
that none of the material on any of the petitioners' Web sites is
included within the definition.

124. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
125. Id. at 478.
126. Id. at 479.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Reno, 31 F. Supp. at 479.
130. Id.
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Lawyers for the ACLU argued that the new law is much broader
than its supporters will admit."' Ann Beeson, a lawyer for the
ACLU, proposed that many news sites and other sites that deal
with controversial topics like homosexuality and sexual education
will be too costly for organizations that do not have the money
necessary to implement safeguards. Being forced to implement
digital barriers to deter minors from visiting the sites, the
petitioners argued, will deter adults as well. This will prevent
these sites from communicating freely, and also from generating
revenue from advertising, among other sources. 3 2 Beeson said that
the law "does not apply simply to adult-oriented businesses on the
Internet, but has a much broader definition that could apply to any
commercial Web site that distributes material that could be deemed
harmful to minors."'3
The Justice Department, defending COPA, stated that the ACLU
and its coalition of plaintiffs were "describing a world that is really
pure fantasy, a world of those who object to any regulation of the
Internet whatsoever."' 34
C. DistrictCourt Analysis
Judge Reed agreed with the petitioners that the statute's
coverage, by use of the term "harmful to minors," was vague and
overbroad. In response to the Government's argument, he stated
that "there is nothing in the text of the COPA, however, that limits
its applicability to so-called commercial pornographers only;
indeed, the text of COPA imposes liability on a speaker who
knowingly makes any communication for commercial purposes
'that includes any material that is harmful to minors,' and defines a
speaker that is engaged in the business as one who makes a
communication 'that includes any material that is harmful to
minors."' Therefore, the statute would cover any speaker who has
a Web site that only has some material that would be considered
131. Jeri Clausing, U.S. Argues Online Smut Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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harmful to minors.'35 Among the petitioners are speakers who
offer Web sites that transmit information, including visuals,
concerning gynecology, sexual health, visual art and poetry,
resources for gays and lesbians, and online magazines. Some of
this material would undoubtedly be covered by the statute, while
obviously not being in the business of commercial pornography.'36
Judge Reed utilized strict scrutiny in analyzing COPA. Looking
to Ginsberg and Sable Communications, he stated that the

Government clearly has a compelling interest in protecting minors,
"including shielding them from materials that are not obscene by
adult standards." '37 However, the means used to achieve this
interest were not narrowly tailored as to be constitutional. The
Government failed to introduce any evidence to the Court that
minors would not be able to circumvent any sort of identification
technologies that Web sites would implement. 3 Judge Reed cited
a Third Circuit opinion, FabulousAssociates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission,"' a case concerning dial-a-porn

services requiring access codes. In rejecting the scheme, the Third
Circuit stated that "preventing 'a few of the most enterprising and
disobedient young people' from obtaining access to these messages
did not justify a statute that had the 'invalid effect of limiting the
content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable
for children."" 4 In essence, this court was not ready to enforce a
law abridging adults' constitutional rights when minors may be
capable of circumventing the technology. Judge Reed found that
blocking or filtering technology, suggested by the petitioners,
would be at least as protective without being as restrictive."'
In conclusion, Judge Reed that this was a difficult decision for
him to make, especially since the best interests of minors were
involved. However, the "hard fact is that sometimes we must
make decisions that we do not like. We make them because they
135. Reno, 31 F. Supp. at 480.
136. Id. at 484.
137. Id. at 495.
138. Id. at 496.
139. 896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990).
140. Reno, 31 F. Supp. at 496.
141. Id. at 497.
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are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we
see them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to
the process that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to express
distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued
principle that dictates the decision. This is one of those rare
142
cases."
Judge Reed stated that he personally regretted delaying the
protection of children from inappropriate materials. 143 However,
this law was so sweeping in nature that its impingement upon First
Amendment principles would do more harm than good to children
in the long run.'" The Government has the option
of appealing the
145
injunction to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
D. Does COPA Have a Future?
Once again, it seems that vague definitions have doomed
Congress' latest attempt to protect minors from material on the
Internet. The District Court discussed in depth why the "harmful
to minors" definition would cause a problem. However, the court
did not reach the issue of how that term would be defined. It
merely stated that certain Web sites that provided information
about sexual practices, among other things, would most likely fall
under the coverage of the statute, even though they are not
commercial pornographers.
As mentioned previously, COPA adopts the basic obscenity test
from Miller v. Californiato determine what would be "harmful" to
minors. Within this definition is the phrase "applying
contemporary community standards," language lifted right out of
the Miller decision.'46 Where Congress thinks it is being extremely
careful by abiding by Supreme Court precedent, it is in fact making
a large error.

142. Id. at 498.
143. Mandels, supranote 122.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2329.
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The nature of the Internet is obvious in that it is a worldwide
network, enabling people to communicate with each other, no
matter their location. It is unclear how community standards could
be employed to block certain material on a Web site that originates
from an entirely different location. What may be considered
harmful to minors in Salt Lake City, Utah may be perfectly
acceptable to people in New York City. Yet it would be
impossible for a Web site to transmit certain material to Internet
browsers in New York than it was transmitting to those in Salt
Lake City. This seems to be another stumbling block the statute
will face if the Government chooses to appeal the District Court
judgment.
CONCLUSION

COPA seems to be headed down the exact same path that the
CDA took when the Supreme Court struck it down. The courts
are obviously very cautious about regulating the Internet, a
medium that is still very new and mysterious to many people. As
Judge Reed recognized in his opinion, "unlike the newspaper,
broadcast station, or cable system, Internet technology gives a
speaker a potential worldwide audience."' 47 Until Congress can
harness the power of this vast medium without trampling on the
Constitution, the Internet will go unregulated.

PeterJacobson

147. Reno, 31 F. Supp. at 484.
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